U.S. Coast Guard | JC Designs

U.S. Coast Guard
Human-Computer Interaction and Design Experience

Designing a safe transition to a new MH-65 helicopter electronic flight instrument display.

MY ROLE

National Capital Region Air Defense Facility Detachment Supervisor

MY RESPONSIBILITY

Responsible for operational readiness, safety, and training during platform transition.

TEAM
Jane Carley & U.S. Coast Guard Members

TIMELINE

JULY 16 TO JUNE 24

01. Overview

The Coast Guard’s Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI) mission is a national-level homeland defense capability responsible for identifying, tracking, and intercepting non-compliant aircraft entering restricted U.S. airspace, most notably around Washington, D.C. RWAI crews operate in highly congested, time-critical environments and coordinate in real time with the Federal Aviation Administration, North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the U.S. Secret Service. Mission success depends on rapid situational awareness, precise communication, and reliable human performance, where even small errors can have significant consequences.

In July 2022, the Coast Guard’s National Capital Region Air Defense Facility (NCRADF), located at Washington National Airport, transitioned its RWAI aircraft from the analog MH-65D helicopter to the MH-65E—a platform featuring a digitally integrated flight deck, multifunction displays, and new automation behavior. Unlike many aircraft transitions, this change occurred while maintaining continuous 24/7 alert operations.

A CBS This Morning segment below provides additional context on the RWAI mission and its elevated risk environment.

This transition presented a complex human-centered design challenge: how to support experienced pilots in safely adapting long-established mental models and workflows to a new human–computer interface, without interrupting mission readiness or increasing operational risk. This case study examines how human-centered design principles were applied to training, procedures, and operational constraints to enable safe adoption of a new system in a zero-margin environment.

02. Problem

How might we transition experienced Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI) crews from an analog cockpit to a digitally integrated flight deck—introducing new interaction patterns, information hierarchies, and automation behavior—while maintaining uninterrupted, time-critical homeland defense operations and minimizing safety risk?

MH-65D Cockpit

Analog Gauges

MH-65E Cockpit

Multi-Function Displays (MFD)

The MH-65D cockpit relied heavily on analog instrumentation, distributed gauges, and pilots had well-established habits and scan patterns developed through years of operational use. In contrast, the MH-65E introduced a digitally integrated flight deck with multifunction displays, consolidated information hierarchies, and increased reliance on automation. While these changes improved capability and situational awareness, they fundamentally altered how pilots perceived, prioritized, and interacted with flight-critical information—particularly during time-critical intercept launches.

MH-65D to MH-65E Helicopter Transition

03. Research
Research for this project focused on understanding how pilots with different levels of experience and interaction history would adapt to the MH-65E during a live operational transition. Through pilot feedback, synthesized pain points, and the development of personas and comparative user journey maps, I identified key challenges related to mental model disruption, cognitive load, automation trust, and crew coordination under time-critical conditions.

Pain Points

"I have been flying analog gauges for 20 years - this is overwhelming."

Many RWAI pilots had built their expertise in predominantly analog cockpits, making the sudden increase in digital interaction and automation a significant shift in how information was accessed and interpreted.

"My scan pattern is completely different. I can't find anything fast enough - especially at night."

The transition to a digitally integrated flight deck disrupted long-established scan patterns, requiring pilots to relearn how and where to locate critical information. This challenge was amplified during night operations, when visual workload increased and reliance on instrument interpretation became significantly higher.

"Can I still meet mission response times with this setup?"

Uncertainty around the new interface raised concerns about efficiency and task completion time during critical launch phases. For pilots operating under strict response timelines, even small delays in information access or system interaction were perceived as mission-impacting risks.

"Are you confident the new auto-pilot won't over-torque the aircraft during takeoff?"

Introducing new automation behavior required pilots to recalibrate trust in the system, particularly during high-risk phases of flight. Limited transparency into how the automation would behave during takeoff increased concerns around mode awareness and loss of manual control.

"We have to share a navigation map screen now. I always flew North Up, but my copilot prefers heading up."

In the MH-65D, each pilot could maintain an independent map display, allowing individual orientation preferences without impacting crew coordination. In the MH-65E, a shared map display required crews to negotiate a single orientation, introducing new coordination overhead and reducing shared situational awareness during time-critical operations.

Personas

These personas represent two ends of the user spectrum affected by the MH-65E transition—an experienced pilot adapting long-established analog workflows, and a newer pilot comfortable with digital systems but still building operational confidence within the RWAI mission.

User Journeys

These journey maps compare how the MH-65E transition affected pilots with different experience levels, highlighting how mental models, automation trust, and crew coordination evolved across each stage of operations.

Related Systems & Transition Models

In addition to pilot research and internal analysis, we examined other aircraft platforms and organizations that had experience with similar technologies or large-scale aircraft transitions. This comparative research helped inform both interface expectations and transition strategy for the MH-65E.

From a systems perspective, the MH-60T provided a useful point of reference due to its use of similar multifunction display (MFD) technology. Reviewing how information was initially presented on the MH-60T displays helped establish baseline expectations for display layouts, information prioritization, and potential adaptation strategies for the MH-65E digital cockpit display.

We also examined how other military organizations managed aircraft transitions at the unit level. Discussions with the U.S. Air Force highlighted a key contrast: Air Force units are often able to temporarily shut down operations during aircraft transitions, relying on backfilled crews and aircraft from other locations to maintain mission coverage.

The Coast Guard’s NCRADF did not have this flexibility. Due to the limited number of RWAI-qualified pilots nationwide, the unit was required to transition aircraft while maintaining continuous operations. This constraint reinforced the need for a human-centered transition approach that prioritized incremental adoption, error tolerance, and crew confidence rather than a traditional “stop-and-start” conversion model.

04. The Design Process

This project spanned multiple roles and operational contexts, allowing me to contribute to the MH-65E transition from early system development through live operational implementation. Across each phase, my focus remained consistent: designing procedures, training, and workflows that supported safe human performance in a time-critical, zero-margin environment.

Phase 1: Early System Framing & Procedural Design (2014 to 2018)

Coast Guard Aviation Training Center, Mobile, AL

During my assignment at the Coast Guard Aviation Training Center, I supported the early development of the MH-65E platform as it was being evaluated for the Rotary Wing Air Intercept (RWAI) mission. This work focused on shaping how pilots would interact with the aircraft long before it entered operational service.

Key contributions included:

Framing the initial RWAI checklist structure for the MH-65E
Testing the aircraft against operational performance requirements specific to the RWAI mission
Reviewing and refining checklist workflows through simulator-based practice intercepts
Observing how pilots interacted with new digital displays, automation logic, and alerting systems

This phase established a foundational understanding of how changes in cockpit interaction and system behavior would impact pilot scan patterns, workload, and decision-making under pressure.

Phase 2: Operational Transition Planning (2021 to 2024)

NCRADF Detachment Supervisor, Washington National Airport

When I arrived at the NCRADF, the unit was approximately one year out from transitioning from the MH-65D to the MH-65E. As the senior officer at the unit, I was responsible for readiness and safety and led the transition plan that had to occur without interrupting 24/7 homeland defense operations.

Key planning considerations included:

Sequencing the arrival of four MH-65E aircraft while retiring four MH-65Ds
Balancing aircraft availability with pilot qualification levels
Coordinating limited training resources and strict timelines

This phase required designing a transition plan that accounted for human readiness, not just equipment delivery.

Phase 3: Training Design & Skill Transfer

Simulator-Based Transition & RWAI-Specific Training

Pilots completed a three-week MH-65E transition course at the Aviation Training Center, conducted entirely in simulators due to resource constraints. To better support RWAI-specific needs, we supplemented the standard curriculum with additional simulator sessions focused on intercept workflows.

Design decisions included:

Pairing highly experienced pilots with deeply ingrained scan patterns alongside more junior, digitally fluent pilots
Encouraging shared learning and cross-validation of techniques
Emphasizing understanding why procedures existed, not just how to execute them

This approach helped surface early friction points related to scan disruption, automation trust, and information prioritization.

Phase 4: Safe Familiarization & Real-World Practice

Ground Trainer + Progressive Flight Exposure

Two months before the first MH-65E arrived on site, we requested a ground-based MH-65E mock-up from the Aviation Training Center. This allowed pilots to physically interact with the new cockpit in a no-risk environment, supporting early familiarization and confidence-building.

Once pilots returned from transition training we completed evolutions in a crawl, walk, run progression:

First, they immediately flew MH-65E warm-up flights focused on everyday aircraft operations
These flights required real radio communications, crew coordination, and decision-making
Next pilots completed daytime RWAI-specific training flights, followed by night RWAI sorties

This phased exposure allowed pilots to rebuild scan patterns and habits in increasingly realistic contexts during incrementally more challenging events.

Phase 5: Iteration, Feedback, and Hazard Mitigation

Learning in Live Operations

As pilots completed training flights, they shared lessons learned via email with the rest of the unit, creating an informal but effective feedback loop. Several critical human-centered issues emerged:

Loss of external scan: As crews focused on learning new displays, there was a dangerous tendency for everyone to look inside the cockpit
TCAS audio overload: Frequent alerts during low-level departures masked Air Traffic Control communications, increasing risk during a critical phase of flight
Autopilot behavior during departures: Automation often overcompensated during obstacle avoidance, forcing pilots to heavily guard or disengage the system under high workload

These insights led me to explore alternative procedures in some cases in collaboration with the Aviation Training Center.

Phase 6: Adaptive Constraints for Safety

Operational Readiness with Reduced Risk

Prior to standing RWAI alert duty in the MH-65E, I requested a temporary expansion of response timelines. Although crews were technically qualified, this buffer acknowledged the real risk of cognitive slips during rapid starts—such as reverting to MH-65D habits or executing steps out of sequence.

This design choice prioritized:

Error recovery over error avoidance
Safety over strict performance metrics during early adoption
Long-term trust and confidence in the new system

Process Takeaway

Rather than treating the MH-65E transition as a one-time training event, we approached it as an iterative human-centered design problem, continuously adapting procedures, training, and constraints to support safe performance in a complex socio-technical system.

Designing for Cognitive and Operational Accessibility

In a safety-critical aviation environment, accessibility extends beyond visual or physical impairments to include cognitive load, situational stress, and varying levels of user experience. The MH-65E transition required ensuring that all pilots—regardless of prior exposure to digital systems—could safely access, interpret, and act on critical information under time pressure. Key accessibility considerations included supporting pilots with deeply ingrained analog mental models, minimizing information overload during rapid-response launches, and ensuring procedures remained usable during night operations and high-workload phases of flight. Design decisions such as progressive training exposure, checklist clarity, expanded response timelines during transition, and shared mental model reinforcement helped reduce barriers to safe system use and supported inclusive operational performance across mixed-experience crews.

These considerations ensured that the system remained usable not only for ideal users, but for all pilots operating under fatigue, stress, and real-world variability.

06. Key Lessons Learned

This project reinforced that successful system transitions in safety-critical environments depend as much on human-centered design as on technical capability. Introducing a new human-computer interface, which in this case was a digitally integrated cockpit, required more than procedural training—it required supporting pilots as they unlearned deeply ingrained habits and rebuild trust in new interaction patterns under extreme time pressure.

Several key lessons emerged. First, designing for expert users means respecting existing mental models and providing pathways for gradual adaptation rather than expecting immediate proficiency. Second, automation must be introduced with transparency and error tolerance, particularly during high-risk phases of operation where predictability and trust are essential. Third, shared interfaces can unintentionally alter team dynamics, making alignment and coordination a design responsibility rather than an individual burden.

Another critical lesson was that even with thorough planning and testing, not all issues emerge until a system is placed into real operational use. In high-stakes environments, early, real-world use often surfaces unexpected interaction challenges, edge cases, and safety risks. The responsibility of the designer does not end at deployment; it requires rapid recognition of issues, fast iteration, and timely procedural or training adjustments—especially during the early adoption phase when risk is highest.

Finally, this experience highlighted that constraints such as continuous operations and limited training resources are not obstacles to human-centered design, but inputs to it. By treating the transition as an iterative process rather than a one-time event, we were able to adapt workflows, training progression, and operational timelines to support safe performance while maintaining mission readiness.